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Abstract 
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Summary 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to empirically analyse the effects of the Bank of Japan’s 
anti-deflationary Quantitative Easing Policy carried out between March 2001 and April 
2006. In doing so, this study also reviews the zero bound to interest rates, defined as the 
primary constraint to the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy at the interest 
rate floor. The results of the economic models contained in this study confirm the 
economic significance of a sustained increase in liquidity in fostering a return to 
inflationary pressures. Moreover, the findings of the study confirm that effective anti-
deflationary policies may not necessarily entail extreme measures on the part of a 
central bank; on the other hand, credibility coupled with a resolved commitment may 
very well be enough to provide for positive macroeconomic repercussions.  
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Chapter One  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Monetary authorities have throughout the years played host to a seemingly continuous 
struggle against undue movements in prices, with most of their efforts focussed on 
limiting inflation. Considerably less attention, however, has been paid to deflation, a 
situation of persistent downward pressures on prices. The reason for this discrepancy in 
emphasis is primarily due to the very limited number of deflationary episodes 
throughout modern economic history, which is in stark contrast to the unrelenting 
inflationary climate that has so far been a hallmark of most of the world’s economies.  
 
The past few years have witnessed, nonetheless, a notable increase in studies dealing 
with deflation, particularly as more and more central banks adopt strict inflation targets 
(IMF, 2003) (Appendix 1: Figure 1). The primary catalyst of this promulgation in 
deflation analysis has undoubtedly been Japan’s deflationary experience. For more than 
ten years between 1995 and 2006 Japan’s ailing economy provided economic circles 
with an actual case-study of deflationary pressures at work (Ahearne, 2002). Japan’s 
prolonged deflationary spiral was buttressed by expectations of future lower prices, 
making it extremely hard for the economy to move back towards more normalised 
expectations of higher future prices (Svensson, 2005). Moreover, the overwhelming 
difficulties faced by Japanese central bankers in ridding Japan of deflation showed 
clearly that the conventional instruments of monetary policy used traditionally in the 
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fight against inflation were no longer applicable under a deflationary scenario 
characterised by deeply-rooted deflationary expectations (IMF, 2003).  
 
Seen in this light, economic theory in the aftermath of the Japanese experience no 
longer assumes deflation simply as inflation with a negative sign but rather as a wholly 
distinct economic phenomenon requiring its own blend of preventive and remedial 
measures, particularly when deflation becomes entrenched in an economy due to 
deflationary expectations (Buiter, 2003). Economic theory proposes a number of 
measures that may be introduced in such scenarios, among the more salient being the 
outright purchases of long-term bonds and other financial instruments, lowering the 
yield curve on long-term bonds and widening the range of assets eligible for collateral 
for bank borrowing from the central bank (IMF, 2003).  
 
These policy proposals carried out in unison were the mainstay of a series of systematic 
monetary expansions carried out between 2001 and 2006 by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in 
an aggressive quantitative easing policy aimed at flushing the Japanese banking sector 
with excess liquidity. Quantitative easing remains to this day a controversial topic in 
monetary economics, with divergent opinions on its success and effectiveness 
(Kirchner, 2006). Its significance remains nothing short of unique however given that it 
is one of very few policies which offer insights into the conduct of monetary policy at a 
binding zero interest rate floor. It is also a veritable showcase into the vital importance 
of fostering inflationary expectations as a key weapon in fighting deflation. 
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This study attempts to analyse the effects of quantitative easing on three key Japanese 
economic indicators, namely: Japanese M2+Certificates of Deposit; Japanese long-term 
interest rates on newly-issues ten-year government bonds; and the yields on ten-year 
Japanese government bond future contracts listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Quantitative easing is measured as the first difference in the accounts of commercial 
banks held at the Bank of Japan, and captures in a direct manner the rapid expansion of 
Japan’s monetary base (Maeda et al, 2005). Japanese M2+Certificates Deposit is a key 
indicator of Japanese economic performance (Kirchner, 2006), whereas the long-term 
government bond interest rate is used as a proxy for long-term monetary policy. The 
yield on ten-year government bond future contracts is used as a proxy for general 
expectations regarding the performance and return of Japanese long-term government 
bonds.  
 
In analysing the effects of Japanese quantitative easing, Chapter Two looks at the 
literature behind quantitative easing and the zero bound to interest rates with particular 
reference to the literature pertaining to the Japanese experience. Chapter Three reviews 
the methodology of this study through an explanation of the data and economic models 
used. Chapter Four presents the results and implications of the economic models, the 
analysis of the limitations of this study and a number of relevant recommendations. 
Chapter Five concludes by putting forward the author’s considerations on the relevance 
of such studies in the light of an increased tendency on the part of many of the world’s 
major central banks in favour of low-inflation targets.  
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Chapter Two  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents firstly the principal economic literature with respect to deflation 
and the zero bound to interest rates, defined as that interest-rate floor below which 
conventional monetary policy loses much of its effectiveness. This is followed by a 
review of the literature pertaining to monetary policy alternatives available at this zero 
bound. Consideration is then given to a number of theoretical papers on quantitative 
easing as well as various empirical studies on the effects of quantitative easing on the 
Japanese economy.  
 
 
2.1 DEFLATION 
 
‘In its most vicious form, deflation is undeniably a calamity. Although 
central banks around the world have spent the past two decades worrying 
about inflation, a fall in the general level of prices can have far worse 
consequences.’ (The Economist, 1998) 
 
Deflationary episodes throughout history have been few and far between, and as a 
result, there remains to this day an apparent perplexity surrounding the popular 
perception of deflation. William Buiter (2003) defines deflation as “a sustained decline 
in the general price level of current goods and services, that is, a persistently negative 
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rate of inflation”. Emphasis must be made on a number of points contained within this 
definition. Firstly, falling prices only constitute deflation when they are sustained for a 
significant period of time. Secondly, deflation must refer to a sustained fall in the price 
level for current goods and services, and not just asset prices or other individual 
commodity categories. For instance, a persistent fall in house prices on its own is not 
defined as deflation unless it influences other commodity prices and brings about a 
sustained fall in the relevant overall price indices. 
 
Further consideration is needed in order to move beyond this somewhat constrained 
definition of deflation. Buiter himself (2003) states four reasons why deflation is not 
just a negative inflation rate. Firstly, significant deflation may lead to a zero bound to 
interest rates, which may in turn severely restrict the conduct of conventional monetary 
policy.
1
  This point is confirmed by Yates (2002) and referred to in greater detail in 
Section 2.3 below. Secondly, the costs to society from deflationary-induced 
redistributions from debtors to creditors are significantly higher than inflationary-
induced redistributions from creditors to debtors. Deflation is, therefore, seen as being 
more conducive to default and bankruptcy than inflation, particularly since banks are 
more likely to cut credit lines under deflation than under inflation (IMF 2003). Thirdly, 
there is the consideration relating to the so-called sacrifice ratio. Comparatively more 
employment and output are foregone during deflation since it is significantly harder to 
                                                 
1
  The same cannot be said about interest rates under inflationary scenarios, for there exists no theoretical 
upper bound to interest rates. Lack of central bank credibility may indeed undermine the effectiveness of 
monetary policy under significant inflationary pressures. In a deflationary scenario, however, monetary 
policy becomes immediately ineffective at the zero bound, regardless of central bank credibility issues.  
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induce demand during a deflationary scenario than it is to dampen it during inflation. 
Fourthly, Buiter states a commonly-held, though still highly valid consideration, that 
there is indeed a dearth of practical knowledge about deflation due to the scarcity of 
deflationary episodes throughout history. Comparing different deflationary episodes 
throughout time and space is an extremely risky task given the economic, monetary and 
institutional variations that arise in different countries and time periods. This view is 
echoed by Bernanke (1999), who states that the Japanese scenario is in no way 
comparable to other seemingly similar deflationary experiences such as those which 
characterised the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression.  
 
Understanding what causes deflation in the first place is nevertheless possible through 
an application of one of the most basic tenets of economic analysis: movements in 
prices. Deflation implies either a rise in aggregate supply or a fall in aggregate demand, 
though these two phenomena are very likely to occur in tandem during a deflationary 
scenario. Supply-driven deflation or technological deflation occurs when a country’s 
producers lower prices in response to consistent improvements in an economy’s 
productive capacity. This was clearly illustrated during the nineteenth century, when 
copious increases in economic productivity resulted in decades of falling prices (IMF, 
2003). Given subsequent increases in demand, the effects of technological deflation are 
not considered too harmful to an economy. Demand-driven deflation on the other hand 
occurs when producers lower prices in response to negative demand shocks. Deflation 
of this sort is very rarely anticipated, and may effectively wreak havoc on previously 
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seemingly bullish economic systems (IMF, 2003), as happened in the United States in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression (Buiter, 2003).  
 
The Japanese scenario is characterised by both supply and demand-driven deflation, 
though it is undoubtedly the latter deflation type that was the catalyst responsible for 
wreaking havoc on the Japanese economy. Demand-deflation buttressed by deflationary 
expectations was undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to the effectiveness of conventional 
monetary policy, and was for more than a decade the principal policy headache of the 
BOJ. The following section reviews in brief the principal literature pertaining to the 
Japanese deflationary scenario. 
 
 
2.2 THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 
 
Though it is not the intention of this study to present an in-depth analysis of the causes 
of the Japanese deflationary experience, it is relevant to note some important 
characteristics of the Japanese scenario, as are mentioned in a number of sources, 
including Taggart Murphy (1996), Bernanke (1999), the Bank for International 
Settlements (Nakaso, 2001), Ahearne (2002), Kimura et al (2002), Buiter (2003), and 
the IMF (2003).  
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The stratospheric rise of the Japanese economy following the end of World War Two is 
widely regarded by many as the direct result of extensive cooperation between large 
firms and financial institutions, with the financial sector being heavily regulated by the 
Ministry of Finance until it was deregulated in the early part of the 1970s (Nakaso, 
2001). Japanese industrial growth throughout the second part of the twentieth century 
was spurred on by rapid land and housing development, and exhibited very low rates of 
public share offerings and mergers or takeovers by foreign corporations. Japanese firms 
were nonetheless able to expand consistently through the acquisition of significant bank 
loan financing, much of which was obtained by bigger firms as part of an intricate – and 
at times murky – network of business alliances called keiretsu. (Taggart Murphy, 1996). 
Keiretsu alliances were the Japanese version of American conglomerates and South 
Korean chaebols, though with much greater interdependence with respect to their 
financing partners. The primary objective of the keiretsu business structures was to 
provide long-term employment for Japanese workers, an attitude which was reflected in 
the overall economy as firms endeavoured for firm growth rather than for profit 
maximisation. Larger firms within the keiretsu maintained their competitive edge in 
foreign markets by pushing for consistently lower costs and better quality throughout 
their supply chain. Firms loyal to this modus operandi were rewarded with seemingly 
unlimited sources of finance in the form of extensive loans obtained in the keiretsu‘s 
name. In turn, banks were guaranteed credit security through informal arrangements 
whereby keiretsu leaders would bail out failed subsidiaries rather than resort to formal 
litigation procedures. Taggart Murphy (1996) states that: 
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“Whereas American-style business behaviour is checked with respect to 
the quest for profits and the threat of litigation, in Japan these two are not 
at all binding; instead, one finds the constant search for cost reduction 
and the web of network firms each holding shares in one another.”  
 
Spurred on by keiretsu growth and ambitious government-led infrastructural initiatives, 
the Japanese economy witnessed enormous increases in economic capacity. Japanese 
Real GDP exhibited consistent double-digit growth during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
grew by nearly 3.8% per annum between 1980 and 1990 (Bernanke, 1999) (Appendix 
1: Figure 2). The Japanese economic miracle was nonetheless accompanied by a notable 
lack of consolidation in Japan’s financial sector, particularly its banks, which remained 
strikingly underdeveloped given the level of growth in the rest of the economy (Nakaso, 
2001) This lack of transparency and accountability within the Japanese banking system 
was ultimately one of the main factors that precipitated the Japanese economic 
recession following the bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble in 1991 (Ahearne, 
2002). For a while it seemed as if Japanese economic resilience would prevail, with 
GDP growth for 1991 at a level of 2.5%. Japanese financial institutions were by now, 
however, showing serious signs of economic strain due to extensive non-performing 
loans backed by very little productive external collateral (Kimura et al, 2002). Problems 
with Japan’s financial system came to a head in the mid-nineties with the bankruptcy of 
Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen in 1994, followed by a string of high profile bankruptcies 
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culminating in the collapse of Hokkaido Takushoko Bank, Yamaichi Securities, and the 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan (Nakaso, 2001). By March 2001 more than 110 
financial institutions had collapsed, leaving consumer confidence and investment 
sentiment in tatters. Domestic spending suffered greatly, pushing Japanese growth rates 
down to their lowest rates in decades. Price inflation also fell drastically, hitting the zero 
level in 1995 (Appendix 1: Figure 3). This point is seen by many as the starting point of 
Japan’s decade-long deflationary spiral, characterised by a stagnant economy cemented 
by deflationary expectations (Ahearne, 2002).  
 
Having briefly considered the literature with respect to some salient factors leading up 
to Japan’s deflationary scenario, it is now pertinent to consider some important studies 
on the conduct of conventional monetary policy instruments with special emphasis on 
the liquidity trap caused by the zero bound to interest rates. 
 
 
2.3 MONETARY POLICY AND THE ZERO BOUND TO INTEREST RATES 
 
Buiter (2003) identifies three conventional instruments of monetary policy: the nominal 
spot exchange rate, the stock of base money, and the short risk-free nominal interest rate 
on non-monetary financial claims. Monetary authorities are in theory limited to the free 
and effective control of only one of these policies at any single point in time, 
particularly in countries characterised by a high degree of capital mobility and a 
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reasonably small say in global capital markets. The three instruments of monetary 
policy are considered briefly below. 
 
The use of foreign exchange management – particularly devaluation – as a monetary 
policy instrument is regarded chiefly as a weapon of last resort. In times of economic 
stagnation and deflationary pressures however a devaluation of a country’s currency 
may improve that country’s trade surplus given that the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied (Svensson, 2001).  This point is referred to in Section 2.4 in the discussion on 
monetary policy instruments available at the zero bound to interest rates. The stock of 
base money as a primary monetary policy instrument on the other hand constitutes a 
principal pillar of quantitative easing and is therefore considered in Section 2.5.  
 
By far the most widely-used tool of conventional monetary policy however is the short-
term interest rate, wielded by central bankers worldwide as a primary tool in their 
struggle to keep price movements under control. Changes in short-term interest rates 
induce movements in other key interest rates, influencing the behaviour of economic 
agents such as banks, firms, and individuals (Suda, 2003). Monetary authorities may 
also bring about desired changes in consumption and investment demand by credibly 
announcing future interest rate changes (Bernanke et al, 2004). A reduction in the 
current short term nominal interest rate will boost both private consumption and 
investment demand, with the opposite being true for an interest rate rise (Buiter, 2003). 
In times of inflationary pressures central banks will tend towards increasing the short-
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term interest rate in a bid to dampen aggregate demand. Similarly, central banks will 
face increased pressures to lower the current short-term interest rate during periods of 
deflationary pressure and economic stagnation in a bid to stimulate aggregate demand.  
 
There is a crucial limit however to the extent to which a central bank can lower interest 
rates. This is called the zero bound level, and is given by that level of interest rates 
below which further reductions in interest rates are not possible (IMF, 2003). The zero 
bound to interest rates is illustrated by Yates (2002) using the following example. In a 
world characterised by only money and default-free government securities, 
governments would not be able to offer negative interest rates on government securities 
since individuals would avoid paying the negative interest rates on government bonds 
by swapping money for bonds. This zero bound to interest rates may not necessarily fall 
precisely at the zero rate: it will be higher than zero when there are significant 
advantages to holding money as opposed to holding government bonds. On the other 
hand, it will be lower than zero when there are significantly higher advantages of 
holding government bonds to holding money. A valid argument in favour of eliminating 
the zero bound to interest rates was put forward by Gesell (1949), who proposed taxing 
money. This proposal however is viewed by economists as somewhat unconventional 
(Buiter, 2003 and Yates, 2002), and is considered in Section 2.4 below.  
 
An economy caught at the zero bound level to interest rates is therefore unable to 
stimulate aggregate demand through reductions in the official short-term interest rate, 
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and is said to be caught in a liquidity trap.  The Japanese scenario between 1995 and 
2006 bears striking similarity to this liquidity trap scenario, as shown by analysis of 
official figures and statements. Throughout the early 1990s the BOJ lowered interest 
rates in response to lower inflation figures in spite of economic growth of more than 3% 
per annum during 1995 and 1996 (Kimura, 2002). By 1995 the BOJ had lowered its 
uncollateralized overnight call rate - Japan’s key short-term interest rate - to 0.5% 
(Kimura, 2002). The BOJ would further reduce this rate to 0.02% in February 1999, 
following which it introduced its zero interest rate policy in April 1999. In August 2000 
the BOJ announced an end to deflation, increasing the official interest rate but lowering 
it back to zero soon after in what many believed to be an enormous blunder by the BOJ 
(The Economist, 2006). Throughout 2000, and early 2001, the zero interest rate policy 
generated little results in terms of stimulating aggregate demand due to the fact that in 
spite of its remarkably low level, the expansionary effect of the zero interest rate was 
being dissipated by a falling price level (The Economist, 2006). 
 
A number of notable commentators called for the BOJ to do more with respect to 
dealing with Japan’s deflationary crisis. Krugman (1999) called for the BOJ to make a 
credible announcement of future inflation. His proposal however was criticised by a 
number of commentators including Buiter, who stated that adopting a formal inflation 
target without specifying explicit policy proposals aimed at reaching that target would 
be like “spitting in the wind” (Buiter, 2003). The IMF (2003) reiterated the importance 
of effective policy as the only tangible instrument capable of breaking deflationary 
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expectations. Bernanke (1999) commented on the BOJ’s monetary policy stance, stating 
that: 
 
“Having pushed monetary ease to its seeming limit, what more could the 
BOJ do? Isn’t Japan stuck in what Keynes called a “liquidity trap”? I will 
argue here that, to the contrary, there is much that the Bank of Japan 
could do to help promote economic recovery in Japan, […] a more 
expansionary monetary policy is needed.” 
 
Having exhausted the conventional interest-rate policy route, and facing repeated calls 
for renewed strategies in the fight against Japan’s protracted deflationary pressures, the 
BOJ announced the introduction of a new quantitative easing policy in March 2001, in a 
bid to stave off Japan’s deflationary spiral. At that time quantitative easing was, for all 
intents and purposes, an unprecedented policy strategy; one of a handful of proposed – 
though untested – monetary policies available at the zero bound interest rate floor. The 
following section considers the literature with respect to these alternative monetary 
policies. 
 
 
2.4 MONETARY POLICY AT THE ZERO BOUND 
 
A number of policies have been proposed as alternatives to the conventional interest-
rate route to monetary policy obstructed by a binding floor to interest rates. Among the 
 15 
most important of these one finds more active fiscal stabilisation, taxes on money to 
lower the zero bound to interest rates, buying assets denominated in foreign currency in 
the hope of devaluing the exchange rate, money ‘rains’ or transfers to the private sector, 
and using open market operations to buy up long government bonds or private sector 
assets (Yates, 2002). These various options are now considered briefly in turn. 
 
More active fiscal stabilisation implies an outright expansion in the government’s fiscal 
programme either through an increase in capital or current spending (including 
education, health and defense) or an outright increase in the degree and amplification of 
automatic stabilisers such as income and unemployment benefits and (lower) taxation. 
However, an increase in fiscal stabilisation may suffer from time lags, particularly if 
parliamentary approval is required for its implementation. This is in stark contrast to the 
relative speed at which monetary policy is introduced and implemented by independent 
central banks. Increases in fiscal stabilisation may also be thwarted by a general public 
that indefinitely defers from spending such expansionary fiscal stimuli out of fear of a 
reversal of such measures once deflation is over, leading to a possible case of Ricardian 
Equivalence (Yates, 2002). 
 
A tax on money is the next instrument on the list of possible monetary policy 
alternatives at the zero bound. It was Gesell (1949) who proposed taxing individuals on 
the basis of their money stocks, arguing that a tax on money would effectively lower the 
floor on interest rates, allowing governments to offer negative interest rates on other 
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government securities. A tax on money would, in theory, simulate circumstances 
tantamount to an inflationary scenario. Its primary weakness, however, remains the 
enormous costs of enforcement. Buiter and Panigirtzolou (1999) propose a system 
whereby the legal tender of cash becomes conditional on it being periodically presented 
for re-issue through stamping, punching, or some other easily recognisable sign. Yates 
(2002) however advises against this policy, citing a clear lack of practical experience in 
operating such a tax. It is widely assumed that individuals would do their utmost to 
evade such a tax not simply in order to avoid payment but in a direct effort to preserve 
the highly-valued anonymity benefits provided by cash-based receipt and payment 
systems. 
 
A devaluation of currency as proposed by Svensson (2001) - mentioned in Section 2.3 
above - is important in the light of this discussion because it introduces an important 
concept in the study of monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: central bank 
printing of money. Bernanke (1999) looks at the Japanese deflationary experience, and 
argues that the BOJ could have induced a devaluation of the Yen by printing an 
indefinite amount of money and subsequently buying foreign assets. Foreigners would 
only sell their assets if the Yen depreciated, and the BOJ could have continued printing 
money till it did. A subsequent Yen depreciation would have induced inflationary 
pressures through the associated effects of a long-run appreciation of the currency, a fall 
in long-term interest rates, and an increase in international demand for domestic assets. 
This proposal is also referred to by Buiter (2003) who admits that there is reasonable 
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proof that the Marshal Lerner Condition would apply in Japan’s long-run scenario – 
though not in the short-term. Yates (2002) further elaborates on this proposal by 
arguing, however, that few central banks would in reality be willing to risk debasing 
their currency for the purpose of carrying out anti-deflationary currency devaluations.
2
  
 
Another monetary policy alternative available at the zero bound consists of so-called 
‘money rains’, or, as they are more commonly known in the literature, Friedman’s 
Helicopter Drop of Money (Yates, 2002). In conventional open market operations 
monetary authorities and the general public exchange bonds (which yield a positive 
return under positive interest rates) in return for money (no return).  In a liquidity trap, 
however, both money and bonds yield zero return and hence are seen as being perfect 
substitutes (Buiter, 2003). A helicopter drop of money would entail in this regard 
monetary authorities giving out money without requesting bonds or other securities in 
return. Such a measure would, at least in theory, induce inflationary pressures through 
an increase in aggregate demand and a lowering of actual real rates. The concept of 
money rains hinges primarily on money creation, and there is agreement, at least in the 
literature, that such a proposal would in fact have the desired effects. Buiter calls this 
policy “The one that always works” (Buiter, 2003).  
 
Having said that, there is an element of debate, however, as to how such money rains 
could be carried out. Yates (2002) calls for cash handouts administered through 
                                                 
2
  This is in addition to the political implications of such a strategy given the sensitive geo-politics of the 
Dollar-Yen-Yuan relationship. 
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people’s bank accounts and through welfare systems for those not in possession of such 
bank accounts. Goodfriend (2000) on the other hand calls for monetised tax cuts. 
Regardless of which method chosen however, there are a number of considerations to 
be made. Firstly, a money rain might present credibility issues for a central bank 
engaging in such handouts, particularly if these are carried out repeatedly over a period 
of time. An economy might over time come to depend on such money rains. Secondly, 
the wealth effect of such a money rain will only occur if people are not perfectly 
forward looking. If they are, they will expect government to reverse the money rain in 
future and will therefore not be influenced by the money rain itself. In this regard 
however Goodfriend (2000) argues that money rains would still have positive liquidity 
effects in spite of their zero wealth effect. Yates (2002) states that: 
 
“An analogy would be if the central bank were to give out cars to the 
private sector, and promise to take them back in the future. There would 
be little wealth effect from the car loan. But while the private sector had 
extra cars, they could, if they wanted, make extra journeys, which they 
might value.” 
 
The importance of an increase in liquidity in dampening deflationary expectations – 
whether through money rains, devaluations financed by printing of money by monetary 
authorities, or other policy instruments - is also noted by the IMF (2003), which states 
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that historical experience with respect to deflationary episodes shows that a “large and 
sustained increase in liquidity” is essential in fostering inflationary expectations.  
 
It is this increase in liquidity which lies at the heart of the next alternative monetary 
policy proposed with respect to the zero bound limit to interest rates: quantitative 
easing. The next section reviews the literature with respect to the conceptual framework 
at the root of the Bank of Japan’s Quantitative Easing Policy carried out between March 
2001 and April 2006. 
 
 
2.5 QUANTITATIVE EASING 
 
On the 19
th
 of March 2001 the Bank of Japan announced a new Quantitative Easing 
Policy (QEP) intended to eliminate once and for all Japan’s deflationary spiral. 
Advocates of a more expansionary monetary policy applauded the Bank’s seemingly 
invigorated anti-deflationary stance whilst critics of such apparently unconventional 
policy instruments were somewhat less keen and warned of a heavy price to be paid by 
the Japanese economy if the BOJ failed yet again to pull the country out of its ten-year 
deflationary conundrum (Spiegel, 2006). There was a measure of consensus however: 
firstly, that it was high time that the BOJ intervened more vigorously with respect to the 
country’s ailing zero interest rate policy; and secondly, that the new quantitative easing 
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policy was an unprecedented step into the unknown for any monetary authority 
(Spiegel, 2006 and Maeda et al, 2005).   
 
A look at the literature will expound on the theoretical concepts of quantitative easing. 
Quantitative easing is defined by Buiter (2003) as those central bank policies directed 
towards achieving an increase in the economy’s monetary base (Appendix 1: Figure 4) 
and carried out in tandem with the official interest rate or instead of it when the interest 
rate is at its lower bound. 
 
The theoretical rationale behind quantitative easing is given by Goodfriend (2000), who 
argues that such a strategy can in theory provide for increases in broad liquidity services 
to an economy suffering negative demand shocks, particularly in times of significant 
deflationary pressures. Goodfriend explains that central bank trades of money for 
certain long term government bonds can actually increase broad liquidity in an 
economy, whereas trades of money for short-term governments bonds – typically traded 
in open market operations - do little to affect broad liquidity, particularly at the zero 
bound to interest rates (when money and short-term government bonds are seen as 
being perfect substitutes). The increase in broad liquidity brought on by central bank 
purchases of long-term government bonds from the public is seen as having two distinct 
inflationary-generating effects: firstly, it induces economic agents to bid up asset prices 
as they attempt to rid themselves of this extra liquidity; and secondly it consolidates 
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short-term interest rates at their zero bound and leads to further downward pressures on 
long-term interest rates. 
  
An important caveat in this respect is the possibility of increased risk inherent in central 
bank dealings of less liquid long-term bonds, which might expose monetary authorities 
to increased vulnerability due to default risk. Yates (2002) argues, however, that this 
increased vulnerability is easily overcome through a credible central bank 
announcement that it would be in future accepting less liquid bonds, effectively 
increasingly their liquidity potential.  
 
Moreover, Goodfriend (2000) argues that central banks can further increase broad 
liquidity in an economy by engaging in trades of money for other illiquid private assets, 
as well as foreign currency that is viewed as being less liquid than the domestic 
currency being offered.  Monetary authorities may also bring about increases in a 
country’s monetary base through outright financing of government expenditures, 
transfer payments, and tax cuts (Buiter 2003).  
 
Having seen the primary rationale behind quantitative easing, it is pertinent to note 
some practical underpinnings of the QEP strategy carried out by the BOJ. Japanese QEP 
policies consisted almost exclusively of open market operations directed towards long-
term government securities, with foreign exchange transactions and outright financing 
operations not considered an integral part of Japan’s QEP strategy (Maeda et al, 2005). 
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Oda and Ueda (2005) identify two principal policy instruments at the heart of the BOJ’s 
QEP strategy: firstly, a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), that is, a commitment by the 
BOJ to keep its official short-term interest rate at zero for as long as the country 
experienced deflation; and secondly, a significant expansion in the economy’s monetary 
base, providing bank reserves in excess of the amount needed to keep the short-term 
interest rate at zero (Appendix 1: Figure 5). 
 
The QEP strategy framework consisted of the following three pillars, as specified by 
Oda and Ueda (2005), Kirchner (2006) and Maeda et al (2005): 
 
a) Target: Using commercial banks’ and financial institutions’ Current Account 
Balances (CABS) held at the Bank of Japan as the main monetary policy operating 
target (Appendix 1: Figure 6).
3
 
 
b) Duration: A commitment by the Bank of Japan to maintain the provision of 
ample liquidity through the CABS until the year-on-year increase in Japan’s core 
consumer price index becomes positive on a sustained basis.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
  A Current Account Balance at the BOJ is a prerequisite for financial institutions to operate in Japan. By 
April 2005 (exactly a year before the withdrawal of QEP), the number of parties operating within the 
BOJ’s QEP strategy amounted to more than 150 (Maeda et al, 2005). 
4
 An important consideration – though not vital for the sake of this discussion – is that Japan’s core 
consumer price index ignores perishables but considers the price of energy. This point is harped upon 
repeatedly by The Economist (2006) as a source of bias with respect to Japanese deflationary figures, and 
is believed to have consistently underestimated Japanese deflationary calculations.   
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c) Primary Instrument: Increasing the outright purchases of Japanese long-term 
government bonds as the primary instrument for liquidity injections. 
 
Kimura et al (2002) and Oda and Ueda (2005) give some important figures with respect 
to the BOJ’s QEP framework. BOJ outright purchases of long-term government bonds 
increased from four hundred billion Yen per month in March 2001 to six hundred 
billion Yen per month in August 2001. This would be further increased to one trillion 
Yen per month in February 2002 (Appendix 1: Figure 7). CABS at the BOJ – on 
introduction of QEP – stood at roughly four trillion Yen, the then required amount with 
respect to bank reserves. The target CABS level was set at five trillion Yen in March 
2001, and increased to six trillion Yen in September 2001.
5
 By December the target was 
once again raised to ten to fifteen trillion Yen, and reached a maximum of thirty-six 
trillion Yen in March 2004 (Appendix 1: Figure 5). The CABS level would hover 
around the thirty trillion Yen figure until the withdrawal of QEP in April 2006, when 
the BOJ initiated procedures to reduce the level of excess CABS following modest 
inflationary increases. The BOJ would increase its official interest rate to 0.25% in July 
2006, thus formally bringing to a close its zero interest rate policy and raising interest 
rates for the first time in six years.
6
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  The BOJ would customarily increase CABS significantly during the first three months of the calendar 
year in order to provide for increased liquidity demands due to the approaching fiscal year-end. 
6
  The July 2006 interest hike is sometimes regarded as the first Japanese interest rate increase in more 
than ten years, ignoring the BOJ’s interest rate hike blunder in 2001. 
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2.6 THE EFFECTS OF QUANTITATIVE EASING 
 
Having considered the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the BOJ's quantitative 
easing strategy it is now pertinent to note a number of prominent studies on the effects 
of the quantitative easing process. Empirical studies on the impact of QEP are in 
strikingly short supply, though this is somewhat inevitable given the relatively short 
timeframe since QEP was withdrawn by the BOJ in April 2006. A number of studies 
have, nonetheless, attempted to empirically examine the impact of the BOJ’s QEP 
strategy. Their findings are discussed in turn below. 
 
In one of the earliest studies on quantitative easing, Kimura et al (2002) state that by far 
the most evident effect of QEP was its role in helping preserve financial market stability 
by providing Japanese banks with ample liquidity. Quantitative easing is seen in this 
regard as having mitigated the negative impacts of possible further collapses among 
Japan’s financial institutions, though the authors find few additional significant effects 
of QEP, stating that the impact of QEP – at the time of the paper being published in 
2002 - remained “highly uncertain and very small, if any.” (Kimura et al, 2002). 
7
 
 
Suda (2003) gives a brief but thorough review of QEP, arguing that the increase in 
CABs by the BOJ reduced the risk of liquidity shortages and maintained a measure of 
stability within Japan’s financial markets. Suda also points towards QEP as having been 
                                                 
7
  The IMF would, in 2003, state that “the cumulative growth in base money has not been aggressive 
enough to improve expectations, but it may well have played a role in preventing deflationary 
expectations from worsening.”  (IMF, 2003). 
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responsible for Japanese long-term rates falling to their lowest level in history, though 
admittedly she provides little empirical analysis to prove that QEP was the effective 
catalyst of this fall. Suda claims that there is little evidence of quantitative easing 
having had significant effects on financial lending and other aggregate economic 
indicators, stating that: “an increase in monetary base has hardly had any effect on 
either economic activity or inflation expectations” (Suda, 2003). 
8
 
 
In another – and more recent – empirical study on quantitative easing, Oda and Ueda 
(2005) focus on the effects of QEP on interest rates with respect to medium and long-
term bonds. The authors – who hail from the Bank of Japan and Tokyo University 
respectively – tentatively conclude that the BOJ’s monetary policy from 1999 onwards 
functioned primarily through the zero interest rate commitment rather than specifically 
through QEP-induced open market operations. The Bank’s zero interest rate policy 
strategy resulted in a lowering of the expectations component of interest rates, though 
with little effects on the risk premium component.  The authors fail, however, to find 
significant effects of the BOJ’s QEP policy on Japanese interest rates, though they do 
find limited evidence pointing towards QEP having had a signalling effect with respect 
to the BOJ’s commitment towards maintaining an accommodative monetary policy 
regime. This seems to confirm that QEP was intended by the BOJ primarily as a 
signalling device for the BOJ’s ZIRP rather than as an outright economic instrument 
intended to directly revive Japan’s economy.  
                                                 
8
  Kimura and Suda’s studies must be seen in the light of a QEP programme still very much in its infancy, 
and cannot, therefore, be used as conclusive evidence against QEP.  
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It is Kirchner (2006) who provides one of the principal - and more importantly, one of 
the few non-BOJ commissioned - analysis of quantitative easing. Kirchner maintains 
that the BOJ’s QEP strategy was constrained by a lack of resolve with respect to 
carrying out more aggressive monetary expansions. Kirchner states that members of the 
Japanese Monetary Policy Board considered QEP to be little more than a signalling 
device for inducing inflationary expectations, effectively relegating the impact of QEP 
to a simple ‘policy duration effect’. This latter effect is repeatedly illustrated through 
the significant emphasis made by the BOJ with respect to its commitment to maintain 
quantitative easing whilst at the same time pursuing very little aggressive monetary 
expansions. Kirchner (2006) alleges that the BOJ did not force excess liquidity on 
financial institutions but rather accommodated their demands for greater liquidity, 
varying the increases in CABs with the expected demand for CABs by the financial 
institutions themselves. This is confirmed in a number of comments made by BOJ staff 
including deputy governor Yamaguchi, who is quoted by Kirchner as having stressed 
the importance of an accommodating rather than an aggressive QEP stance (Hetzel, 
2003 and Kirchner, 2006). This puts further weight to Kirchner’s hypothesis that the 
increase in Japan’s monetary base was absorbed by financial institutions themselves 
rather than passed on to the general public in the form of increased bank lending and 
consumer and investment expenditure. Kirchner concludes by stating that the QEP 
could have been less conventional and more aggressive, embracing a more monetarist 
view of the monetary policy transmission process rather than restricting itself simply to 
influencing general expectations of future prices through the policy duration effect. 
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The effects of QEP are also referred to in a number of articles compiled by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF). In an article published in 2006, the FRBSF’s 
Vice-President, Mark Spiegel, states that there is still little evidence of increased 
lending as a result of QEP, though he does refer to lower long-term interest rates as a 
possible QEP effect. Spiegel also refers to quantitative easing having favoured weaker 
Japanese financial institutions and thus having ultimately played an indirect role in 
postponing structural reforms within the Japanese financial sector, though he insists that 
the overall effect of QEP had been positive. This is corroborated by The Economist 
(2006), which states that: “Although their industry is still overcrowded and they lack 
clear plans for finding fresh sources of profit, many of them have cleaned up their loan 
books, are increasing lending and are looking stronger than they have done for a 
decade.” 
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The Quantitative Easing Policy strategy carried out by the Bank of Japan between 2001 
and 2006 represents an unprecedented monetary policy exercise carried out in the face 
of significant deflationary pressures. It is undoubtedly a fascinating insight into how 
monetary policy may operate within the realm of a binding floor on interest rates 
brought on by persistent deflationary expectations.  
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As Japan tentatively moves out of its protracted ten-year deflationary conundrum, 
empirical studies of QEP have confirmed its positive contribution to maintaining a 
measure of financial stability in Japan’s troubled financial sector. This effect of 
quantitative easing is assumed to have operated primarily through the policy duration 
effect, signalling the BOJ’s resolute commitment to its zero interest rate policy. There is 
also some evidence of QEP having lowered medium and long-term interest rates, 
though this evidence remains tentative and at times insignificant. Evidence of the 
effects of QEP on key Japanese economic indicators such as domestic spending and 
investment remains scarce, and where available, inconclusive.  
 
The next chapter introduces the economic models and data used in this study together 
with an explanation of their key components and the subsequent econometric tests 
conducted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Chapter Three  
THE MODEL 
 
This section provides a description of the econometric models used in this study and an 
analysis of the dataset used. Consideration is also given to the relevant tests conducted 
to check for stationarity, cointegration, and serial correlation. 
 
 
3.1  MODEL AND VARIABLES 
 
An attempt is made in this section to build three econometric models in order to 
illustrate the effects of the Bank of Japan’s Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP). The 
impact of quantitative easing – measured using the changes in Current Account 
Balances (CABS) of Financial Institutions held at the Bank of Japan – is tested on three 
distinct variables: Japanese M2+Certificates of Deposit; Japanese interest rates on 
newly-issued ten-year government bonds; and the yields on ten-year Japanese 
Government Bond (JGB) Future Contracts traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
These three dependant variables – together with the explanatory CABs variable – are 
explained in further detail below. 
 
The explanatory variable in this study is given by the primary target of the BOJ’s 
quantitative easing policy: the Current Account Balances of financial institutions held 
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at the Bank of Japan (referred to in this study as CABS). Throughout the initial stages 
of the BOJ’s QEP strategy CABS of financial institutions at the Japanese central bank 
experienced rapid increases as the BOJ sought to flood the Japanese banking system 
with excess liquidity by increasing its outright purchases of Japanese government 
bonds. Changes in the CABS variable are therefore directly indicative of the extent and 
magnitude of the BOJ’s QEP strategy, and are, in this light, essential to the purposes of 
this study. 
 
The M2 + Certificates of Deposits variable is one of four key Japanese money stock 
indicators, and is composed of M1 + Quasi-money + Certificates of Deposits. M1 
consists of cash currency in circulation and deposit money. Quasi-money is composed 
of time and savings deposits, fixed and instalment savings, non-residents’ yen deposits, 
and foreign currency deposits held by money owners. To summarise therefore: 
 
M1:   Cash Currency in Circulation + Deposit Money  
Quasi-Money:  (Time and Savings Deposits + Fixed and Instalment 
Savings + Non residents’ Yen Deposits + Foreign 
Currency Deposits held by Money Owners) 
M2 + CDS:  M1 + Quasi-money + Certificates of Deposits 
 
The importance of the M2+CDS variable in light of this study is due to its proxy effect 
with respect to bank lending, particularly the creation of new deposits for domestic 
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consumption and investment. Changes in M2+CDS are used as measure of movements 
in financial activity and fluctuations in bank lending and saving. This variable is 
particularly important given the Japanese economy’s high reliance on domestic 
spending, its customary high savings ratios and the traditional importance given to cash-
based payments systems. 
  
The next variable under consideration is the Japanese long-term interest rate on newly-
issued ten-year government bonds (referred to in this study as the RATES variable). 
This variable is an essential yardstick of any central bank’s long-term monetary policy 
stance and is essential in the light of this study due to the ineffectiveness of short-term 
interest rates as a result of Japan’s protracted liquidity trap characterised by official 
short-term interest rates at a zero level. Of particular importance to this study is whether 
QEP succeeded in influencing changes to Japanese long-term interest rates. 
  
The final variable used in this study refers to the yields on ten-year JGB future 
contracts listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (referred to in this study as the YIELDS 
variable) which are used as a proxy for general expectations regarding the performance 
and return of long-term government bonds. In a liquidity trap scenario characterised by 
short-term interest rates at their zero level, the yields on longer-term government bonds 
become important yardsticks of expectations regarding inflation and future policy 
decisions. The extent of this signalling effect inevitably depends on the demand and 
supply conditions of the bonds in question, though the high trading volume inherent in 
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TSE trading for ten-year JGBs is a relatively good guarantee of an efficient market price 
which properly reflects demand and supply conditions as well as future price and 
interest rate considerations.  
 
The three models used in this study are therefore constructed in the following manner: 
9
 
 
∆Log (M2CDs) =  β1 + β2∆ Log (CABS) + ut  (Equation 3.1.1) 
∆ (RATES) =   α1 + α 2∆ Log (CABS) + ut    (Equation 3.1.2) 
∆ (YIELDS) =  η1 + η2∆ Log (CABS) + ut    (Equation 3.1.3) 
 
Where: 
 
M2CDS:  M2 + Certificates of Deposit 
CABS:  Current Account Balances of Financial Institutions held at the BOJ 
RATES:  Japanese Interest Rates on Newly-Issued Ten-Year Government Bonds 
YIELDS:  Yields on Ten-Year JGB future contracts listed on the TSE. 
 
Logs are used with respect to Equation 3.1.1 above in keeping with established 
empirical studies of a similar nature, particularly since it is expected that the 
relationship between the explanatory and dependant variables is of a curvy-linear 
                                                 
9
  Both models were subsequently modified and fitted with ARMA specifications. The final models are 
shown in Sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, together with a discussion of the relevant tests carried out.  
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nature. Equations 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 are expressed in linear-log form in order to facilitate 
analysis of the impact of CABs on the interest and yield rates variables. 
 
A priori expectations of coefficient signs are assumed to be as follows, though it is 
important to keep in mind that such expectations are, at best, assumptions, given the 
uncertain results exhibited by similar empirical studies as illustrated in Section 2.6 
above. Nevertheless, the following signs are expected a priori: 
  
β2 = (+) A positive relationship between CABS and M2+CDS. An increase in a 
country’s monetary base as part of an expansionary monetary policy programme is 
assumed to have a positive effect on M2+CDS, ceteris paribus. 
 
 α 2 = (-) A negative relationship between RATES and CABS. It is believed that 
an increase in the outright purchases of Japanese long-term government bonds would 
have increased their price and brought about a fall in their interest rate. However, it is 
doubtful whether this fall in long-term interest rates would have persisted towards the 
end of quantitative easing, which was itself characterised by expectations of increased 
interest rates and the prospect of future sale of government-held JGBs acquired during 
the initial stages of the QEP framework. 
  
η2 = (-) Initial a priori rationale with respect to the relationship between 
YIELDS and CABS would assume a negative relationship between CABS and the 
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yields on long-term JGB contracts, based on the belief that an increase in the outright 
purchases of long-term JGBs by the BOJ would have increased their price, lowered 
their interest rate and subsequently lowered their yield. In the latter stages of 
quantitative easing, with demand for increased CABS stabilising in 2004 and 
subsequently falling after April 2006, the price of future JGBs would have come under 
considerable downward pressures leading to possible rises in the yields on future JGBs. 
This effect could have been magnified in the latter stages of 2005 and in early 2006 due 
to inflationary expectations and expectations of possible interest rate hikes following 
the imminent withdrawal of the BOJ’s QEP strategy.
10
  A priori, therefore, the 
relationship between CABS and YIELDS is expected to be a negative one. 
 
 
3.2  DATA 
 
The data used in this study consists of 105 monthly observations spanning the period 
between April 1998 and December 2006, compiled by the Bank of Japan and the 
OECD. The dataset time period incorporates both the BOJ’s quantitative easing policy - 
carried out between March 2001 and April 2006 – and Japan’s zero interest rate period 
(April 1999 to April 2006, with a six-month interlude between August 2000 and March 
2001). The data and the respective variable diagrams can be seen in Appendix 2. 
 
                                                 
10
  Throughout late 2005 and early 2006 BOJ officials made no secret of their plans to bring to a halt the 
BOJ’s QEP strategy. The withdrawal of QEP in April 2006 was in fact highly anticipated, as was the 
subsequent interest rate hike in July 2006. 
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The following sections review the econometric tests conducted on the data and models 
in the light of the susceptibility of the time-series data to problems of nonstationarity 
and serial correlation.  
 
 
3.3  CORRELOGRAM TESTS 
 
Correlogram analysis is a principal diagnostic tool for investigating issues of 
nonstationarity in time-series data. A time-series is said to be stationary when its mean 
and variance do not vary systematically over time. Economic time-series exhibiting 
systematic trends and variations are highly susceptible to problems of nonstationarity, 
the presence of which may significantly compromise the validity of econometric 
analysis. Preliminary visual tests on the data relating to each of the four variables used 
in this study revealed significant eye-ball evidence of nonstationarity, particularly with 
respect to the M2+CDS variable.
11
  In spite of having already decided to use the first 
differences of the data for the purposes of this study, the variables were still subjected to 
correlogram tests with respect to both level and first difference analysis (shown in 
Appendix 3).  
 
Level correlograms revealed significant evidence of nonstationarity in the form of a 
linear decline of each of the variables’ Autocorrelation (AC) coefficients. Spikes were 
also observed among a significant number of Partial Autocorrelation (PAC) 
                                                 
11
  Kimura et al (2002) point towards M2+CDs growing at a rate of around 3% per annum. 
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coefficients, particularly at Lag 1.  First difference correlograms showed no linear 
decline in the AC coefficients, though significant spikes were found in both the AC and 
PAC coefficients. The results of first difference correlograms showed significant 
improvement over their level counterparts, though the presence of significant spikes 
made clear the case for ARMA term inclusion. Further stationarity tests were 
conducted, however, on both absolute levels and first difference data levels in order to 
confirm or reject the presence of stationarity. 
  
 
3.4  UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
Unit root testing checks for stationarity in time-series data by regressing observations 
against their lagged values. The variables used in this study were tested for stationarity 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests. The methodology of ADF tests 
differs from conventional Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests in that the former method assumes 
the error term ut to be correlated, and hence adds lagged values of the dependant 
variable to the unit root analysis carried out in the DF test. ADF tests were carried out 
on both the level (Appendix 4) and first difference of the data samples (Appendix 5), 
with each time-series analysed for a constant, as well as a constant and a linear trend. 
The results of the ADF tests confirmed the presence of nonstationarity in the M2+CDS, 
CABS, and YIELDS variables. Unit root testing with respect to the RATES variable 
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rejected the null hypothesis of serial correlation at the 95% probability level but not at 
the 99% level.  
 
Subsequent testing was carried out in order to check for Difference-Stationary 
Processes (DSP) and Trend-Stationary Processes (TSP). Checking for DSP entails 
conducting unit root tests on the first differences of the data in question, whereas TSP 
testing consists of plotting the absolute levels of the data against a time trend. The 
results of DSP testing (Appendix 5) confirmed all four variables to be I (1) and hence 
having stationary first differences. TSP testing on the other hand (Appendix 6) showed 
a significant time trend with respect to the M2+CDS, CABS and YIELDS variables but 
not the RATES variable.  
  
The overall picture which emerged from both correlogram and unit root testing 
confirmed a priori expectations of significant stationarity in the dataset being used. It 
was therefore decided to use first differences for all four I (1) variables. Having said 
that, the absolute data levels were tested for cointegration in order to exhaust any 
possibility of cointegrating relationships between the dependant and CABS variables. 
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3.5 COINTEGRATION TESTS 
 
Regressions composed of nonstationary time-series variables are highly susceptible to 
so-called spurious relationships which may at first glance look robust but are in reality 
false representations of possible correlation between variables. Some nonstationary 
time-series variables however may indeed share an actual long-term non-spurious (or 
equilibrium) relationship, in which case they are said to be cointegrated. Cointegrated 
regressions offer valuable insights into the non-spurious relationship between certain 
nonstationary economic time series.  Popular cointegration testing methods include the 
Engle-Granger (EG) test and the Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) 
test.  The EG test applies unit root testing to the residuals of regressions suspected to be 
cointegrated, whereas the CRDW test compares the Durbin-Watson statistic of the 
regression under study to critical values compiled by Sargan and Bhargava (1983). 
 
EG tests were conducted with respect to the residuals derived from the following 
models (Appendix 7):  
 
a) M2CDS versus CABS;   
b) RATES versus CABS;   
c) YIELDS versus CABS  
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The critical τ EG values were -1.59 (Model (a)), -2.91 (Model (b)), and -3.38 (Model 
(c)). The 1% Engle-Granger critical value of -2.5899 eliminates the possibility of 
cointegration with respect to Model (a) but finds evidence of possible (albeit slight) 
cointegration with respect to Model (b) and Model (c). It is important to note, however, 
that the results of the EG test with respect to Models (b) and (c) must not be taken as 
automatic proof of cointegration due to the lack of resolute certainty with respect to the 
nonstationarity of both RATES and YIELDS variables. 
 
The results of the CRDW test (Appendix 7) confirm doubts as to any significant 
cointegration by failing to provide significant evidence of cointegration with respect to 
all three models. The Durbin-Watson values of 0.284 (Model (a)), 0.276 (Model (b)), 
and 0.398 (Model (c)) all fall very close to the 1%, 5%, and 10% CRDW critical values 
(0.511, 0.386, and 0.322). This finding calls for a rejection of significant cointegration 
in all three models. 
 
Having carried out the necessary tests with respect to both absolute and first difference 
data levels, it is now proposed to focus on initial model testing on Equations 3.1.1, 
3.1.2, and 3.1.3. The implications of the following tests are crucial in deriving the final 
ARIMA Equations used to analyse the effects of QEP, and are thus an integral part of 
the explanation pertaining to the models used in this study. 
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3.6 MODEL TESTING – EQUATION 3.1.1 
 
Initial testing on regression Equation 3.1.1 (Appendix 8) revealed a number of pressing 
issues deserving significant consideration. Of particular importance is the high Durbin-
Watson statistic of 2.76 confirming the presence of serial correlation (given the critical 
values of 2.31 and 2.43). It is to be noted that serial correlation is present in this model 
in spite of having used data first differences. The presence of serial correlation was 
confirmed through a Serial Correlation LM test which rejected the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. Correlogram tests on the regression itself also showed significant 
spikes in both the AC and PAC coefficients. This in turn called for a reformulation of 
the economic model to take into consideration autoregressive, moving average, and 
seasonal autoregressive terms in an effort aimed at understanding better the causes of 
movements in the dependant variable.  
 
The model was modified using a trial and error process of adding and removing ARMA 
terms in tandem with correlogram and serial correlation LM testing in order to identify 
a suitable ARIMA estimation.
12
  This process resulted in the following economic 
model, the results of which may be seen in the final results section (Section 4.1): 
 
∆Log (M2CDS) =  β1 + β2∆ Log (CABS) + β3 AR (7) + β4 AR (12) +  
β5 SAR (1) + β6 MA (2) + β7 MA (9) + β8 MA (12) + ut 
        (ARIMA Equation 3.1.1) 
                                                 
12
  The model used is defined as an ARIMA model since it makes use of all three ARIMA specifications: 
MA and AR terms, as well as the first differences of the original data set. 
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3.7 MODEL TESTING – EQUATION 3.1.2 
 
Econometric analysis of Equation 3.1.2 (Appendix 9) revealed an insignificant 
explanatory variable, the presence of which severely compromised the validity of the 
model itself.  The extremely low R
2
 and insignificant F statistic – though highly 
worrying – are to be expected given the single-variable model specification. Serial 
correlation LM tests confirmed the presence of significant correlation, and correlogram 
analysis showed a number of significant AC and PAC coefficient spikes. This called for 
an immediate review of the model using AR, MA and SAR terms. Correlogram analysis 
and Serial Correlation LM tests were used as the basis for a trial and error method 
similar to that used with request to Equation 3.1.1 in a bid to find the best possible 
ARIMA specification.  
 
This process resulted in the following economic model, the results of which are 
explained in Section 4.2:  
          
 
∆ (RATES) =    α1 + α 2∆ Log (CABS) + α 3 AR (2) + α 4 AR (12) +  
α7 SAR (1) + α 8 SAR (24) + α 9 MA (2) + ut   
 
(ARIMA Equation 3.1.2) 
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3.8 MODEL TESTING – EQUATION 3.1.3 
 
Initial regression results with respect to Equation 3.1.3 (Appendix 10) revealed once 
again an insignificant explanatory variable. This resulted in an extremely low R
2
 value 
and an insignificant F statistic (once again inevitable given the single-variable model 
specification used in model testing so far). Evidence of serial correlation was also found 
through the relevant Serial Correlation LM test and correlogram analysis. Once again it 
was decided to reformulate the model through the inclusion of ARMA specifications. 
 
Equation 3.1.3 was remodelled using AR, MA and SAR terms, with Serial Correlation 
LM testing and correlogram analysis providing vital evidence with respect to the 
validity of the modifications made.    
 
This process resulted in the following economic model, the results of which are 
explained in the Section 4.3:  
          
∆ (YIELDs) =   η 1 + η 2∆ Log (CABs) + η 3 AR(4) + η 4 AR (5) +  
η 5 AR (6) + η 6  AR (26) + η 7 SAR (12) + η 8MA (6) + ut   
 
(ARIMA Equation 3.1.3) 
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Chapter Four  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section expounds on the empirical results of the three models used in this study 
together with an analysis of their salient features. The models are presented individually 
together with a discussion of their economic implications.
13
  The section concludes with 
a brief discussion of the conceptual and practical limitations of such a study, together 
with some recommendations on the matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
  Discussion of the results in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 focusses on the relationship between the CABs 
explanatory variable and the dependant variable (M2CDS, RATES, and YIELDS respectively). A brief 
analysis of the ARMA terms contained in all three regressions is given in Section 4.4. 
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4.1 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.1 
 
∆Log (M2CDS) =  β1 + β2∆ Log (CABS) + β3 AR (7) + β4 AR (12) +  
β5 SAR (1) + β6 MA (2) + β7 MA (9) + β8 MA (12) + ut 
Where: 
M2CDS:  M2 + Certificates of Deposit 
CABS:  Current Account Balances of Financial Institutions Held at the BOJ 
AR (t):  Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
MA (t):  Moving Average term with lag (t) 
SAR (t): Seasonal Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
 
Dependant Variable: DLog(M2CDS) 
Sample (adjusted): June 1999 – December 2006 
Number of Observations: 91 after adjustments 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.00176 0.00057 3.07917 0.00280 
DLOG(CABS) 0.00385 0.00088 4.39344 0.00000 
AR(7) -0.20946 0.06203 -3.37677 0.00110 
AR(12) 0.76236 0.05771 13.21053 0.00000 
SAR(1) -0.55349 0.09200 -6.01622 0.00000 
MA(2) -0.70236 0.05132 -13.68474 0.00000 
MA(9) 0.38591 0.04584 8.41949 0.00000 
MA(12) 0.13351 0.04084 3.26904 0.00160 
          
R
2
 0.856712     F-statistic   70.89303 
Adjusted R
2
 0.844627 Prob (F-statistic)   0.00000 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014702       
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The econometric results of ARIMA Equation 3.1.1 are presented in Appendix 11 
together with the relevant serial correlation LM test and correlogram analysis.  The 
summary results shown above point to the explanatory variables being both individually 
and collectively significant in explaining changes in the dependant variable, and the 
high R
2 
and adjusted R
2
values (0.85 and 0.84 respectively) as well as the significance of 
the F-test are further proof of the robustness of the model results. Serial correlation tests 
carried out on the model reject the presence of serial correlation, and correlogram 
analysis on the regression itself shows significantly decreased AC and PAC coefficient 
spikes.  
 
Further analysis with respect to the CABS explanatory variable is pertinent in order to 
consider the economic implications of the regression results. The latter variable - the 
proxy used for quantitative easing - is found to have a significant positive, albeit small, 
effect on the M2CDS variable. As the model shows, an increase of 1% in the rate of 
change in the CABS variable is expected to bring about an increase of 0.003% in 
changes in M2CDS ceteris paribus. The nature of this relationship as shown by the 
regression results confirms two principal – and possibly paradoxical – a priori 
expectations: firstly, that expansions in a country’s monetary base do have positive 
effects on a country’s economic indicators; and secondly, that the impact of the BOJ’s 
expansionary QEP framework seems to have been somewhat limited in terms of its 
direct macroeconomic effect on the Japanese economy. The partial slope coefficient 
value implies that the first difference in CABS would have had to be incremented by 
 46 
125% for Japanese M2CDs to have grown by at least 0.5% in a one month period 
ceteris paribus.
14
  CABS increases of such a magnitude were few and far between 
however, as analysis of CABS movements shows: out of 103 first difference 
observations, 83 of these are positive or negative increments of less than 25%; only 8 
observations are positive increments of more than 25%, with the remaining 11 
observations being negative increments greater than 25%. 
 
This point raises a number of questions about the direct macro-economic effects of the 
Bank of Japan’s QEP strategy, and throws doubt over the BOJ’s original intentions. Did 
the BOJ envisage its QEP framework as a direct stimulatory policy instrument? Or was 
it intended rather as an indirect signalling effect designed to influence the economy 
through the policy duration effect? The statistically significant though small co-efficient 
seems more adept at explaining the latter rather than the former. Though there is little 
way of knowing whether the limited effects of CABS expansion on M2CDS growth 
stemmed from the direct success of the policy duration effect or from the failure of an 
originally intended quasi-Friedman Helicopter Drop, the findings of this model seem to 
confirm the arguments of those who look at quantitative easing not as a direct 
stimulatory tool but rather as a signalling instrument intended to shape people’s 
expectations of positive economic change through an illustration of a central bank’s 
resolve in keeping the official interest rate at its zero level.  
 
                                                 
14
  Though a growth rate of 0.5% in one month might seem excessive given an M2CDs annual growth 
rate of 3%, the theory pertaining to unconventional monetary expansions nonetheless advises in favour of 
sudden, large-scale injections of liquidity rather than protracted monetary expansions. 
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Given the findings of this model, therefore, it may be rightly argued that monetary 
expansions intended to serve as a direct positive economic shock – as opposed to 
policies intended to function through the policy duration effect – should be of a severe 
magnitude, carried out promptly and in a somewhat unanticipated manner.
15
  Propelling 
the economy out of deflationary scenarios through the use of extensive and 
unanticipated monetary expansions entails precise, wide-ranging, and decisive policies. 
Having said that, however, this does not in any way dismiss the positive effects of more 
accommodating policies designed to function through the policy duration effect. The 
results of this model prove that such expansions can still serve in stimulating positive 
macroeconomic pressures in an economy. This may indeed offer some solace to the 
more risk-averse central banker wary of helicopter drops or other extreme measures!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 For a good idea of how liquidity enhancing monetary expansions should be carried out, look no further 
than Friedman’s use of the helicopter analogy: sudden, decisive, and wide-ranging.  
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4.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.2 
 
∆ (RATES) =    α1 + α 2∆ Log (CABS) + α 3 AR (2) + α 4 AR (12) +  
α7 SAR (1) + α 8 SAR (24) + α 9 MA (2) + ut   
Where: 
M2CDS:  M2 + Certificates of Deposit 
RATES:  Japanese Interest Rates on Newly-Issued Ten-Year Government Bonds 
AR (t):  Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
MA (t):  Moving Average term with lag (t) 
SAR (t): Seasonal Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
 
Dependant Variable: D(RATES) 
Sample (adjusted): May 2001 – December 2006 
Number of Observations: 68 after adjustments 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.01202 0.00625 1.92210 0.05930 
DLOG(CABS) -0.20786 0.04457 -4.66388 0.00000 
AR(2) 0.65923 0.09912 6.65106 0.00000 
AR(12) -0.10664 0.09060 -1.17710 0.24370 
SAR(1) 0.19243 0.11900 1.61710 0.11100 
SAR(24) 0.25099 0.10170 2.46807 0.01640 
MA(2) -0.96362 0.03179 -30.30968 0.00000 
          
R
2
 0.309089     F-statistic   4.548205 
Adjusted R
2
 0.241131 Prob (F-statistic)   0.00071 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.950846       
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Initial regression results with respect to Equation 3.1.2 had generated an insignificant 
CABS slope coefficient, prompting the reformulation of the model through ARMA 
specifications in the hope of achieving a better overall regression analysis of the effects 
of QEP on Japanese long-term interest rates. The results of ARIMA Equation 3.1.2 
shown in Appendix 12 – a summary of which is shown above – are characterised by 
statistically significant explanatory variables and satisfactory correlogram analysis with 
respect to AC and PAC spikes. Serial correlation LM tests show no significant evidence 
of serial correlation, and the R
2
 value of 0.30 is acceptable given the relatively specific 
nature of the economic model itself. The statistical significance of the CABS 
explanatory variable is of particular importance given the previous insignificant CABS 
variable result shown in initial Equation 3.1.2. The latter variable shows a negative 
relationship between CABS and Japanese long-term interest rates on newly-issued ten-
year government bonds, and the partial slope coefficient of -0.208 implies that a 1% rise 
in CABS brings about a fall of 0.2% in interest rates. This does confirm a priori 
expectations of a negative relationship between movements in CABS and changes in 
Japanese long-term interest rates, though further consideration of this partial slope 
coefficient is pertinent in order to analyse better the relationship between these two 
variables. 
 
The negative relationship between QEP-induced monetary expansions and Japanese 
long-term interest rates is assumed to be based on the underlying economic tenet behind 
conventional open market operations, even when such operations are carried out with 
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respect to longer-term government securities. Increases in outright purchases of 
government bonds by monetary authorities implies upward pressures on prices and, 
hence, lower interest rates. In the Japanese scenario this would have been particularly 
apparent during the initial stages of quantitative easing, when CABS growth rates 
experienced very high increments. The rapid expansion of Japan’s monetary base – 
financed through outright purchase of long-term Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) – 
is assumed to have been the primary reason for the downward trend in JGB long-term 
bond interest rates, which fell from 1.3% in April 2004 to 0.5% in May 2003 (as shown 
in Appendix 2: Figure 2.4). CABS increases throughout this period, however, were far 
larger than those which would have been needed – according to the partial slope 
coefficient aforementioned – to bring rates down by 0.8%. The question which begs to 
be asked however – given the massive overall CABS increase - is the following: why 
did long-term interest rates not fall further than they actually did?  
 
This question is based on a rather simplistic view of the relationship between CABS and 
the RATES variable.  Analysis of CABS figures shows that sudden increments in 
CABS are more often than not followed by sharp falls, with the result that pressures on 
the long-term interest rate in one month would have been mitigated the following 
month. The relationship between the RATES variable and the highly volatile CABS 
variable, therefore, would have been much more stable in the long-run than during the 
short-run. Moreover, one has to bear in mind that policy decisions with respect to the 
long-term interest rates on newly-issued ten-year JGBs would have considered not 
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simply the effects of CABS in that particular month but would have entailed a rather 
more holistic long-term view of the overall economic scenario.  
 
It is to be noted that the negative relationship between the CABS and the interest rates 
on newly-issued ten-year government bonds shown in ARIMA Equation 3.1.2 would 
have been perfectly complimentary to the QEP’s original objectives: enhancing broad 
liquidity through long-term securities purchases, inducing falls in long-term interest 
rates at a time when the short-term interest rate was at its zero bound level. Moreover, 
movements in CABS and Japanese long-term interest rates immediately following the 
withdrawal of quantitative easing confirm the negative relationship between the two 
variables, as shown by rises in long-term interest rates between June 2006 and 
December 2006, which appear to be negatively related to the rapid fall in CABS levels.  
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4.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.3 
 
∆ (YIELDs) =   η 1 + η 2∆ Log (CABs) + η 3 AR(4) + η 4 AR (5) +  
η 5 AR (6) + η 6  AR (26) + η 7 SAR (12) + η 8MA (6) + ut   
Where: 
M2CDS:  M2 + Certificates of Deposit 
YIELDS:  Yields on Ten-Year JGB future contracts listed on the TSE 
AR (t):  Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
MA (t):  Moving Average term with lag (t) 
SAR (t): Seasonal Autoregressive term with lag (t) 
 
Dependant Variable: D(YIELDS) 
Sample (adjusted): July 2001 – December 2006 
Number of Observations: 66 after adjustments 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.00474 0.00193 2.45744 0.01700 
DLOG(CABS) -0.21175 0.03908 -5.41794 0.00000 
AR(4) -0.33279 0.07800 -4.26660 0.00010 
AR(5) -0.20473 0.05477 -3.73817 0.00040 
AR(6) 0.53228 0.09280 5.73615 0.00000 
AR(26) -0.22457 0.06642 -3.38102 0.00130 
SAR(12) -0.38561 0.12301 -3.13484 0.00270 
MA(6) -0.94704 0.02866 -33.04342 0.00000 
          
R
2
 0.441693     F-statistic   6.555077 
Adjusted R
2
 0.374311 Prob (F-statistic)   0.00001 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.2561       
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Initial testing of Equation 3.1.3 had resulted in an insignificant explanatory variable, 
compromising the intrinsic validity of the model. A summary of the results of ARIMA 
Equation 3.1.3 (Appendix 13) on the other hand presents significantly improved results 
compared to the initial equation, particularly with respect to the CABS explanatory 
variable. The explanatory variables are individually and collectively significant, and the 
R
2 
and adjusted R
2
 figures (0.44 and 0.37) and the significant F-test are further proof of 
the model’s robustness. Moreover, serial correlation LM testing and correlogram 
analysis show no significant signs of serial correlation. All in all, the regression results 
not only make for an interesting analysis of the effects of QEP on the yields on ten-year 
government bond future contracts traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, but are also 
important, given that they confirm the results of ARIMA Equation 3.1.2, built on the 
same explanatory variable and on a similar, though not identical, dependant variable. 
 
The partial slope coefficient with respect to the CABs variable (-0.211) implies that a 
1% rise in the rate of change in CABs brings about a negative 0.211% change in the rate 
of change of yields on ten-year government bond future contracts traded on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange ceteris paribus. Downward pressure on bond future yields implies 
upward pressure on bond future prices, downward pressure on interest rates on bond 
futures or both phenomena moving in tandem. Though there may be a plethora of 
reasons for any of the abovementioned movements in rates and prices – particularly in 
highly-sensitive and high-volume derivatives markets such as the TSE – an analysis of 
possible explanations with respect to the overall rising yields is in order. 
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 The author’s hypothesis about the negative sign exhibited by the CABs co-efficient is 
very similar to the rationale with respect to the relationship shown by ARIMA Equation 
3.1.2. In the initial stages of QEP, outright purchases of long-term JGBs would have led 
to increases in their price and a fall in long-term interest rates, reducing the 
attractiveness of future bond purchases in the eyes of investors and the general public. 
As BOJ outright purchases of JGB long-term bonds stabilised however, demand for 
JGBs levelled off, inducing pressures on bond prices to fall, and leading to increases in 
long-term interest rates (in line with the regression results of ARIMA Equation 3.1.2). 
The negative relationship between CABS and YIELDS is also apparent at the end of the 
BOJ’s QEP strategy. Analysis of the relevant CABS and YIELDS variable data plots 
(shown in Appendix 2: Figures 2.2 and 2.5) shows that the rapid fall in CABS in the 
months following April 2006 is accompanied by a rise in yields on government bond 
future contracts, implying falls in the price of bond future contracts, and increases in 
their interest rate. Within the futures market, the effect of rising long-term interest rates 
on bond yields would have been particularly emphasised by the sudden falls in JGBs 
prices stemming from popular expectations that the BOJ would soon conclude QEP and 
sell off all its stocks of acquired JGBs.
16
  Expectations of future interest rate hikes and 
possible inflationary pressures would have further contributed to upward pressures on 
the yield on JGB futures contracts, further reinforcing the negative relationship between 
falling CABS and rising yields.  
 
                                                 
16
  Towards the final few months of quantitative easing there was indeed increased speculation of an 
imminent withdrawal of QEP coupled with high expectations of possible interest rate hikes, prompting 
possible sudden falls in the prices for bond future contracts.   
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4.4 ARIMA IMPLICATIONS 
 
ARIMA Equations 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 are all characterised by the inclusion of auto-
regressive moving average (ARMA) model specifications, including autoregressive 
(AR), moving average (MA) and seasonal autoregressive (SAR) terms.  
 
The inclusion of ARMA terms in such a study is seen as serving two very important 
functions. The first of these relates to the obvious effects of ARMA inclusion with 
respect to the econometric robustness of the results, particularly the BLUE properties of 
the CABs partial slope coefficient. Comparison of the economic models before and 
after ARMA inclusion is testimony to the increased statistical significance of the CABs 
variable following ARMA reformulation, particularly in ARIMA Equations 3.1.2 and 
3.1.3. A second important characteristic of ARMA term inclusion in such a study is that 
the AR, MA and SAR partial slope coefficients shed crucial light on the movement of 
changes in the dependant variables. This is particularly important in time-series studies 
characterised by variables which are highly susceptible to nonstationarity and random 
walk phenomena. ARMA coefficients give important insights into the movement of the 
dependant variables over time, and confirm a priori expectations that the dependant 
variables are influenced not only by their immediate one-period lag but by further lags, 
some of which exhibit high t-test values. ARMA term inclusion is therefore effective on 
two very important counts: reinforcing the robustness of the results with respect to the 
relationship between the dependant and principal explanatory variable and providing 
vital insights into the movement of the dependant variable over time.  
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4.5 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having analysed the results of the econometric models used in this study, it is now 
pertinent to consider a number of limitations and relevant recommendations that may be 
made with respect to the workings and findings of this study.  
 
The principal limitation with respect to the dataset used is undoubtedly the limited time 
period available for post-quantitative easing analysis. The lack of observations in the 
aftermath of the BOJ’s QEP policy provides a dearth of information at a time when 
economic analysis is likely to yield some very important findings relating to the effects 
of QEP. A number of pertinent questions remain, particularly those relating to the 
magnitude of the BOJ’s reduction of its CABS stock, the rate of growth in M2CDS 
following the withdrawal of QEP and the extent of the Japanese economic recovery 
itself. 
17
 The obvious recommendation in this respect is to allow for a longer time period 
in which to analyse the effects of QEP, though it is the author’s belief that extending the 
period of analysis would not result in significant alterations to the findings of this study 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Recommendations are also in order with respect to the variables used in this study. The 
CABs variable is believed to have been the proper proxy for quantitative easing, since it 
captures the immediate effects of the BOJ’s outright purchase long-term government 
                                                 
17
  In February 2007 deflation in Japan made a surprise reappearance, though the factors causing it were 
said to be related to events outside the Japanese economy, providing little cause for alarm. 
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securities. The RATES variable is also assumed to have been a correct proxy with 
respect to Japanese long-term interest rates. The M2CDS and YIELDS variables 
however do not command such instant recognition as perfect proxies for an analysis of 
the effects of QEP, particularly the variable relating to the yield on government bond 
future contracts traded on the TSE. Possible recommendations with respect to the 
M2CDS and YIELDS variables are considered in turn below.  
 
The M2CDs variable was chosen due to the great importance it commands – 
particularly in BOJ circles - as an indicator of Japanese economic wellbeing. A list of 
possible alternatives to the M2CDs variable would most certainly include Japanese 
GDP growth, bank lending (domestic, commercial, and industrial), and investment 
expenditure and consumer spending. This last variable is seen by the author as the most 
suitable proxy from among the listed alternatives to M2CDs. Consideration would have 
to be given, however, with respect to any relevant time lags as well as adjustment for 
expenditures with regards to imports and Japanese foreign investment abroad.  
 
Turning to the YIELDs variable used in Equation 3.1.3 and ARIMA Equation 3.1.3, a 
number of concerns spring to mind, in spite of the significant popularity of the Japanese 
futures market, particularly that pertaining to ten-year JGB futures. The principal 
concern with respect to this variable related to the two-way influence of prices and 
interest rates on the yields of JGB future contracts, making it difficult – though not 
impossible - to interpret exactly what was behind movements in JGB yields. Another 
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concern related to the lack of readily available data on the prices – rather than the yields 
– of ten-year JGBs traded on the TSE. Information pertaining to government bond 
future contract prices might have made for an interesting proxy for the effects of the 
QEP strategy on Japanese expectations of future inflation and interest rate movements, 
though it is believed that the YIELDS variable itself does a better job than the futures 
spot price in incorporating such expectations. 
  
Having briefly analysed the implications of ARMA term inclusion with respect to the 
economic models used in this study, it would be pertinent to consider further 
implementation of ARIMA modelling to the models in question, particularly the study 
pertaining to Japanese M2CDs. Though the results of all three equations do substantiate 
the author’s trial and error ARMA inclusion process, there is admittedly much that may 
be done through more advanced economic modelling in order to achieve deeper insights 
into the behaviour of the variables in question. 
 
A similar recommendation relates to including the effect of lags with respect to the 
CABS variable, in order to assess the effect on the dependant variables of previous 
increments in the level of CABS. In spite of a significant a priori belief that CABS 
increments would have been transmitted very quickly through the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, it would still be pertinent to note any possible significant 
effects of lagged CABS changes – or possibly the cumulative CABS level at time t.  
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A further recommendation relates to the use of dummy variables in order to identify 
possible signalling effects of the BOJ’s numerous policies at work during the period in 
question. The use of dummies is considered with respect to the BOJ’s Zero Interest Rate 
Policy (ZIRP – April 1999 to February 2001), its QEP framework (March 2001 to April 
2006), and the period encompassing the end of QEP to the BOJ’s subsequent interest 
rate rises. The introduction of dummy variables would ideally form part of a more 
comprehensive analysis of QEP based on a longer time period in order to lend strength 
to any significant findings with respect to the signalling component of the policy 
duration effect.  
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Chapter Five  
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has attempted to empirically analyse the effects of the Bank of Japan’s 
anti-deflationary quantitative easing policy carried out between March 2001 and April 
2006. In doing so, this study has also reviewed the zero bound to interest rates, defined 
as the primary constraint to the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy at the 
interest rate floor. The realm of monetary policy beyond this zero bound is confined to a 
number of unconventional strategies, many of which are concerned with expansions of 
a country’s monetary base in an attempt at enhancing broad liquidity. The Bank of 
Japan’s quantitative easing policy remains to this day the only circumstance in which 
such monetary policies have been tried and tested.  
 
Has the BOJ’s QEP strategy been vindicated however? There is an encouraging mood 
in Japan, spurred on by modest economic growth, confident Tankan survey results, and 
more importantly, evidence of inflationary pressures at work once again. How much of 
Japan’s recovery can really be attributed to the Bank of Japan’s QEP strategy however? 
The findings of this study provide significant, though very limited evidence, of QEP 
having single-handedly turned the tide in Japan’s protracted decade-long struggle 
against deflation, corroborating similar findings in related studies. There is evidence, 
however, of QEP having stabilised the Japanese banking sector by providing ample 
amounts of excess liquidity, allowing Japanese financial institutions to tentatively clean 
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up their act and provide for a more transparent and equitable banking system, 
particularly in the area of non-performing loans. The positive relationship between the 
Bank of Japan’s monetary expansions and Japanese M2 + Certificates of Deposits – 
notwithstanding persistent consumer pessimism – is proof of the Bank of Japan’s 
determined stance in supporting the economy, typified by the policy duration effect: the 
BOJ’s commitment to resolutely maintain its QEP strategy till Japan’s economy 
registered inflationary pressures. 
  
Analysis of the effects of QEP on Japanese long-term interest rates on newly-issued ten-
year Japanese government bonds (JGBs) confirms the positive effects of QEP in 
lowering long-term interest rates. The expansion in Japan’s monetary base was, 
therefore, successful in lowering interest rates at a time when the traditional tool of 
monetary policy – the short-term interest rate – was regarded as having been effectively 
rendered useless as a result of Japan’s protracted liquidity trap scenario. This confirms 
that central banks need not consider themselves helpless in the face of significant 
obstacles to the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy instruments. 
 
Furthermore, analysis of the relationship between QEP and the yields on long-term JGB 
future contracts listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange confirms the negative relationship 
between BOJ-induced monetary expansions and long-term interest rates. Falls in long-
term interest rates would have reduced the attractiveness of long-term securities, 
encouraging investment and consumer spending. Moreover, the presence of the negative 
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relationship between CABS and long-term interest rates in high-volume markets such as 
the TSE implies that the effects of the BOJ’s monetary expansions managed to 
successfully make their way through the monetary policy transmission mechanism. This 
finding puts further weight to the indirect though forceful role of QEP in fostering 
positive trends in Japan’s tentative move towards normalised inflationary expectations.  
 
To conclude, therefore, it would be pertinent to note a final question with respect to the 
findings of this study: what lessons does the Japanese experience hold for modern 
economies? Traditional economic thought itself imparts little knowledge about deflation 
other than a very conceptual review of its basic tenets. The Japanese scenario, however, 
provides ample material for discussion about how to prevent deflation and how best to 
cure it before it causes ruinous damage to an economy. More importantly, however, the 
Japanese experience holds valuable lessons for Western economies captivated by the 
prospect of ultra-low inflation and doing their utmost to achieve such a scenario with 
apparently little regard for the dangers inherent in very low inflation rates. It is true that 
low inflation has always been typical of economic downturns, a common feature of 
many economies’ business cycles. The advent of globalisation however has led to 
further falls in prices across a wide range of goods and services, dampening in some 
countries the inflationary effects of economic booms. Moreover, increased capital and 
labour mobility will in future persist in keeping price increases at low levels. Though 
the risk of countries falling into cataclysmic deflationary spirals remains significantly 
low, the vulnerability of countries experiencing deflationary episodes is still ever 
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present, particularly in the European Union, where even the mildest deflationary 
scenario might have severe repercussions across the whole continent. The first lesson 
imparted by the Japanese experience, therefore, is that very mild deflation is far more 
calamitous than even moderate inflation, and that the risks of stumbling into a liquidity 
trap increase exponentially as inflation rates fall. Central bankers intent on minimising 
excessive price fluctuations must consider not only the widely-known implications of 
high inflation rates but also the potential risks inherent in minimal price increases, 
including possible deflationary pressures creeping into an economy.  
 
The second lesson imparted by the Japanese scenario relates to the effectiveness of the 
policy duration effect, defined as the macroeconomic signalling effect transmitted 
through an institution’s resolve in maintaining the implementation of a particular policy 
till its primary objective is reached. Effective policy may not necessarily entail 
extensive actions; on the other hand, credibility coupled with resolved commitment is 
enough to provide for positive macroeconomic outcomes. The Japanese scenario might 
not be an example of a direct and decisive anti-deflationary monetary expansion. It 
does, however, prove that the policy duration effect may indeed reap positive effects on 
an economy, albeit in a protracted and at times uncertain manner. This may very well 
disappoint supporters of unconventional policy instruments and helicopter drops, 
though it admittedly provides more than enough solace to the risk averse central banker 
intent on minimising the risks inherent in anti-deflationary monetary expansions carried 
out under a zero interest rate policy constraint. 
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APPENDIX 1 - FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Consumer Price Inflation in Advanced Economies (Bernanke et al, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 2: Japanese Real GDP, CPI and Money Wage Growth (Buiter, 2003) 
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Figure 3: Japanese Real GDP and CPI (Oda and Ueda, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Japanese Monetary base, Money Supply, and Nominal GDP  
(Oda and Ueda, 2005) 
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Figure 5: Current Account Balances Held at the BOJ (Maeda et al, 2005) 
 
Figure 6: Number of Counterparties engaged in QEP (Maeda et al, 2005) 
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Figure 7: Amount of Outright Purchases of JGBs (Maeda et al, 2005) 
 
Figure 8: Yield Rates on Japanese Treasury Bills (TB) and Japanese Government 
Bonds (JGB) (Maeda et Al, 2005) 
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APPENDIX 2 – REGRESSION DATA AND DATA PLOTS 
2.1 Data 
Year CABs Yields M2CDs Rates 
   100 Million Yen  % 100 Million Yen % 
1998:04 39,614 2.181 5,939,343 1.867 
1998:05 39,475 1.975 5,994,941 1.655 
1998:06 40,492 2.057 5,998,149 1.54 
1998:07 35,553 1.982 5,983,584 1.683 
1998:08 41,571 1.808 5,959,439 1.502 
1998:09 57,343 1.522 5,959,311 1.103 
1998:10 37,118 1.538 6,020,853 0.879 
1998:11 44,083 1.690 6,029,840 0.977 
1998:12 43,780 2.509 6,214,936 1.488 
1999:01 43,732 2.410 6,116,531 1.91 
1999:02 46,305 2.213 6,153,414 2.117 
1999:03 61,675 2.075 6,146,748 1.816 
1999:04 42,735 1.831 6,185,383 1.563 
1999:05 46,963 1.776 6,164,148 1.334 
1999:06 46,632 2.379 6,227,500 1.632 
1999:07 48,976 2.216 6,234,356 1.703 
1999:08 48,534 2.405 6,151,611 1.878 
1999:09 60,577 2.124 6,180,517 1.759 
1999:10 49,484 2.220 6,202,029 1.692 
1999:11 53,408 2.218 6,189,145 1.817 
1999:12 233,859 2.047 6,380,106 1.767 
2000:01 53,769 1.982 6,202,595 1.691 
2000:02 148,741 2.231 6,202,671 1.796 
2000:03 183,413 2.167 6,339,881 1.819 
2000:04 54,004 2.084 6,386,872 1.74 
2000:05 54,512 1.956 6,271,463 1.705 
2000:06 51,803 2.052 6,361,902 1.664 
2000:07 50,913 1.958 6,316,030 1.689 
2000:08 50,241 2.122 6,275,459 1.75 
2000:09 52,255 2.081 6,384,104 1.876 
2000:10 40,451 1.999 6,297,371 1.815 
2000:11 43,754 1.808 6,327,748 1.764 
2000:12 68,270 1.860 6,498,631 1.624 
2001:01 50,909 1.683 6,376,495 1.508 
2001:02 46,790 1.562 6,369,684 1.415 
2001:03 58,142 1.509 6,521,371 1.169 
2001:04 50,671 1.495 6,561,997 1.315 
2001:05 50,260 1.380 6,449,283 1.25 
2001:06 57,058 1.375 6,581,678 1.152 
2001:07 50,537 1.448 6,503,165 1.305 
2001:08 59,293 1.444 6,480,642 1.343 
2001:09 124,794 1.469 6,567,647 1.346 
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Year CABs Yields M2CDs Rates 
   100 Million Yen  % 100 Million Yen % 
2001:10 95,268 1.379 6,485,176 1.363 
2001:11 139,639 1.448 6,531,469 1.328 
2001:12 156,153 1.575 6,712,768 1.334 
2002:01 149,974 1.741 6,590,942 1.42 
2002:02 146,277 1.681 6,604,835 1.501 
2002:03 276,107 1.597 6,739,172 1.421 
2002:04 189,886 1.541 6,749,189 1.394 
2002:05 149,749 1.509 6,691,094 1.365 
2002:06 150,532 1.505 6,789,555 1.328 
2002:07 151,248 1.481 6,729,569 1.296 
2002:08 152,276 1.323 6,742,096 1.255 
2002:09 185,325 1.396 6,705,529 1.129 
2002:10 162,012 1.269 6,698,849 1.095 
2002:11 199,185 1.255 6,767,688 0.979 
2002:12 195,625 1.262 6,835,938 0.975 
2003:01 204,192 1.205 6,728,016 0.836 
2003:02 202,234 1.173 6,740,619 0.828 
2003:03 309,297 1.184 6,819,007 0.724 
2003:04 260,111 1.142 6,846,126 0.663 
2003:05 289,436 1.049 6,859,770 0.577 
2003:06 289,315 1.302 6,888,988 0.529 
2003:07 292,479 1.279 6,860,761 0.956 
2003:08 291,163 1.644 6,884,145 1.406 
2003:09 345,600 1.680 6,845,301 1.42 
2003:10 298,360 1.682 6,803,024 1.437 
2003:11 310,185 1.552 6,876,925 1.333 
2003:12 300,307 1.606 6,947,090 1.33 
2004:01 339,676 1.506 6,876,708 1.33 
2004:02 330,731 1.427 6,895,225 1.211 
2004:03 363,600 1.632 6,948,103 1.418 
2004:04 321,517 1.649 6,980,147 1.52 
2004:05 321,497 1.596 6,930,119 1.505 
2004:06 337,339 1.843 7,008,390 1.807 
2004:07 314,101 1.865 7,018,067 1.808 
2004:08 329,885 1.623 6,964,483 1.588 
2004:09 350,726 1.596 6,960,870 1.393 
2004:10 318,820 1.581 6,985,039 1.483 
2004:11 342,170 1.540 6,963,076 1.452 
2004:12 331,784 1.564 7,075,527 1.397 
2005:01 316,211 1.461 6,979,463 1.31 
2005:02 331,024 1.578 6,994,203 1.419 
2005:03 357,562 1.476 7,075,020 1.325 
2005:04 317,807 1.387 7,133,867 1.257 
2005:05 315,506 1.371 7,036,620 1.238 
2005:06 335,895 1.331 7,120,601 1.143 
2005:07 298,062 1.434 7,144,080 1.295 
2005:08 331,925 1.459 7,085,968 1.365 
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Year CABs Yields M2CDs Rates 
   100 Million Yen  % 100 Million Yen % 
2005:09 341,066 1.623 7,099,996 1.45 
2005:10 334,918 1.670 7,068,659 1.513 
2005:11 343,499 1.560 7,087,320 1.454 
2005:12 328,677 1.649 7,217,872 1.488 
2006:01 329,323 1.696 7,108,854 1.547 
2006:02 326,136 1.765 7,116,691 1.598 
2006:03 312,015 1.988 7,184,353 1.759 
2006:04 188,715 2.066 7,248,733 1.956 
2006:05 146,137 1.970 7,120,767 1.849 
2006:06 158,752 2.153 7,185,212 1.901 
2006:07 104,985 2.121 7,151,300 1.927 
2006:08 91,030 1.853 7,136,025 1.668 
2006:09 117,944 1.869 7,178,220 1.628 
2006:10 86,376 1.897 7,138,859 1.718 
2006:11 94,252 1.843 7,152,336 1.69 
2006:12 104,125 1.935 7,283,268 1.645 
 
M2CDS, CABS, YIELDS: Bank of Japan RATES: OECD 
 
2.2 Data Plots – M2CDS (100 Million Yen) 
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2.3 Data Plots – CABS (100 Million Yen) 
 
 
2.4 Data Plots – RATES (%) 
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2.5 Data Plots – YIELDS (%) 
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APPENDIX 3 – CORRELOGRAM TESTS 
 
3.1 Correlograms – Absolute Levels 
 
 
 
3.1.1 M2CDs Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.1.2 CABS Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.1.3 RATES Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.1.4 YIELDS Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.2 Correlograms – First Differences 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 ∆M2CDs Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.2.2 ∆CABS Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.2.3 ∆RATES Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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3.2.4 ∆YIELDS Correlogram (30 lags, roughly one third of 105 observations) 
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APPENDIX 4 – UNIT ROOT TESTS – DATA LEVELS 
4.1 M2CDS 
 
 
4.1.1 Log(M2CDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Log(M2CDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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4.2 CABS 
 
4.2.1 Log(CABS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Log(CABS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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4.3 RATES 
 
4.3.1 RATES Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 RATES Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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4.4 YIELDS 
 
4.4.1 YIELDS Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 YIELDS Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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APPENDIX 5 – UNIT ROOT TESTS – 1
ST
 DIFFERENCES 
5.1  ∆M2CDS – Difference-Stationary Process (DSP) Testing 
 
5.1.1 ∆Log(M2CDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
5.1.2 ∆Log (M2CDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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5.2  ∆CABS – Difference-Stationary Process (DSP) Testing 
 
 
5.2.1 ∆Log (CABS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 ∆Log (CABS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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5.3  ∆RATES – Difference-Stationary Process (DSP) Testing 
 
 
5.3.1 ∆(RATES) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2 ∆(RATES) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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5.4  ∆YIELDS – Difference-Stationary Process (DSP) Testing 
 
 
5.4.1 ∆(YIELDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 ∆(YIELDS) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test – Constant and Trend 
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APPENDIX 6 – TREND-STATIONARY PROCESS TESTING 
 
6 TSP Trend-Stationary Process Testing: Regressing Absolute Levels of the 
Dependant Variable against a Time Trend  (Yt = β1 + β2t + u t) 
 
6.1  M2CDS 
 
 
 
6.2  CABS 
 
 
 
 93 
6.3  RATES 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 YIELDS 
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APPENDIX 7 – COINTEGRATION TESTS 
 
 
7.1 Engle-Granger (EG) Test 
 
7.1.1  Residuals with respect to M2CDS versus CABS – Model (a) 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Residuals with respect to RATES versus CABS – Model (b) 
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7.1.3  Residuals with respect to YIELDS versus CABS – Model (c) 
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7.2 Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) Test 
 
 
7.2.1  M2CDS versus Cabs – Model (a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2  RATES versus CABS – Model (b) 
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7.2.3  YIELDS versus CABS – Model  (c) 
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APPENDIX 8 – MODEL TESTING   
 
EQUATION 3.1.1 
 
8.1 Basic Results  
 
∆Log (M2CDs) t = β1 + β2∆Log (CABS) t + u t 
 
 
 
 
Of particular importance is the high Durbin Watson statistic (which is greater than 
the critical 2.31 and 2.43 values). The Serial Correlation Test with respect to the 
above regression is given below, with the result illustrating a significant presence of 
serial correlation.  
 
8.2 Serial Correlation Test on the above regression 
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8.3 Correlogram test on regression 3.1.1 
 
 
The correlogram test below gives a good impression of the nature of the serial 
correlation exhibited by the regression and confirmed in the Serial Correlation LM test 
shown above. The information given by the relevant spikes at various lags (particularly 
at Lag 1 and Lag 12) were used as the basis for including AR, MA and SAR terms in 
the model as part of a trial and error process which yielded the final regression model. 
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APPENDIX 9 – MODEL TESTING   
 
EQUATION 3.1.2 
 
9.1 Basic Results  
 
∆ (RATES) t = α 1 + α 2∆Log (CABS) t + u t 
 
 
 
The initial regression results presented significant issues. The explanatory variable 
was found to be insignificant, leading to an extremely low R
2
 (this is to be expected 
in a single variable regression). The results also showed significant serial correlation 
confirmed though the serial correlation LM test, given below. 
 
 
9.2 Serial Correlation Test on the above regression 
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9.3 Correlogram test on regression 3.1.2 
 
 
Correlogram analysis of the above equation illustrates significant spikes at Lags 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. There is also a considerable spike at Lag 12. A trial and error method using both 
correlogram analysis and serial correlation LM tests was again utilised in order to 
reformulate the economic model through the inclusion of the relevant MA, AR and 
SAR terms.  
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APPENDIX 10 – MODEL TESTING   
 
EQUATION 3.1.3 
 
10.1 Basic Results  
 
∆ (YIELDS) t = η1 + η 2∆Log (CABS) t + u t 
 
 
 
 
Once again there are severe limitations to the validity of the results, as exhibited by 
the insignificant explanatory variable. This in turn leads to the very low R
2 
(inevitable given a single regression model). Serial correlation was found to be 
present following a Serial Correlation LM test, given below. 
 
10.2 Serial Correlation Test on the above regression 
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10.3 Correlogram test on regression 3.1.3 
 
 
The correlogram below shows a number of significant spikes, particularly at Lags 3, 4, 
5, and 6. Correlogram analysis was used for remodelling the economic equation, 
inserting the relevant MA, AR and SAR terms in order to reduce as much as possible 
the AC and PAC spikes.  
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APPENDIX 11 – FINAL RESULTS  
 
ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.1 
 
 
11.1 ∆Log(M2CDs)t = β1 + β2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
 
11.2 Serial Correlation LM Test 
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11.3 Correlogram of ARIMA Equation 3.1.1 
 
 
∆Log(M2CDs)t = β1 + β2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
As can be seen from the above correlogram, the inclusion of the ARMA terms in the 
above equation has removed most of the AC and PAC spikes exhibited by the original 
regression.  
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APPENDIX 12 – FINAL RESULTS   
 
ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.2 
 
 
12.1 ∆ (RATES)t = α 1 + α 2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.2 Serial Correlation LM Test 
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12.3 Correlogram of ARIMA Equation 3.1.2 
 
 
∆ (RATES)t = α 1 + α 2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
The correlogram analysis shows significant improvements in the AC and PAC 
coefficients. Efforts to remove the PAC spike at Lag 26 resulted in a significant 
increase in the risk of serial correlation, and it was decided to retain the model as 
expressed above.  
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APPENDIX 13 – FINAL RESULTS   
 
ARIMA EQUATION 3.1.3 
 
 
13.1 ∆ (YIELDS)t = η 1 + η 2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.2 Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
13.3 Correlogram of ARIMA Equation 3.1.3 
 
 
∆ (YIELDS)t = η 1 + η 2∆Log(CABS) + ARMA terms + ut  
 
 
 
 
The inclusion of ARMA terms has once again considerably improved the regression 
results, allowing for considerably smaller spikes in both the AC and PAC coefficients.  
